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POLYGRAPH ADMISSION THROUGH
COMPULSORY PROCESS
"If it is not [constitutional], its virtues, if it have any, cannot
save it; if it is, its faults cannot be invoked to accomplish its
destruction. "
Home Building and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 483 (1934)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting).
I. INTRODUCTION
P OLYGRAPH EVIDENCE' IS included within the broad category of expert
testimony, yet it is treated quite differently from other forms of expert
testimony.' If admissible at all for the defense, polygraph evidence almost always
requires the stipulation of the prosecution for it to be admitted into court.3
Such a requirement vests soley, within the hands of a prosecutor, the ability
to eliminate that proof which may be necessary for the defendant to effectively
prove his innocence. Furthermore, in some jurisdictions a defendant cannot
even place his faith in the sympathy of a prosecutor.4 Instead, a rule bars him
'Polygraphy (sometimes called "lie detection") is a technique for detecting truth and deception. The
underlying theory is that an individual's attempts to deceive the examiner leads to a conscious conflict.
This conflict induces fear or anxiety which in turn will produce involuntary physiological changes which
can be measured. See Solnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection,
70 YALE L.J. 694, 699-700 (1961).
The polygraph machine is an electromechanical instrument which measures and records physiological
activity. The polygraph examiner evaluates the recorded responses and interprets them as being indicative
of truth or deception. Abrams, A Polygraph Handbook for Attorneys 4 (1977).
'See infra text accompanying notes 21-34.
'See, Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474, 479 (Alaska 1970); State v. Antone, 615 P.2d 101, 109 (Hawaii 1980);
People v. Monigan, 72 111. App.3d 87, 390 N.E.2d 562, 567 (1979); Conley v. Commonwealth, 372 S.W.2d
865 (Ky. 1974); State v. Corbin, 285 So. 2d 234, 239 (La. 1973); State v. Gagne, 343 A.2d 186, 192 (Me.
1975); Akronom v. State, 40 Md. App. 676, 394 A.2d 1213 (1978); People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352,
255 N.W.2d 171 (1977); Jordan v. State, 365 So. 2d 1198, 1204 (Miss. 1978); State v. Beachman, 616
P.2d 337, 339 (Mont. 1980); State v. Biddle, 599 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Mo. 1980) (en banc); State v. Steinmark,
195 Neb. 545, 239 N.W.2d 495, 497 (1976); State v. LaForest, 106 N.H. 159, 207 A.2d 429 (1964); Fulton
v. State, 541 P.2d 871 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975); Commonwealth v. Gee, 467 Pa. 123, 354 A.2d 875, 833
(1976) State v. Watson, 248 N.W.2d 398 (S.D. 1976); Robinson v. State, 550 S.W.2d 54, 59 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1977); Jones v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 723, 204 S.E.2d 247, 248 (1974); State v. Frazier, 252 S.E.2d
39, 43 (W. Va. 1979). State v. Dean, 103 Wisc. 2d 228, 264 n.18, 307 N.W.2d 628, 646 n.18 (1981).
'See, Williams v. State, 378 A.2d 117, 120 (Del. 1977), cert. den. 436 U.S. 908 (1978); Moore v. State,
229 So. 2d 119 (Fla. App. 1974); State v. Chambers, 240 Ga. 76, 239 S.E.2d 324 (1977); Owens v. State,
373 N.E.2d 913 (Ind. App. 1978); State v. Conner, 241 N.W.2d 447, 457 (Iowa 1976); State v. Lassley,
218 Kan. 758, 545 P.2d 383, 385 (1976); Commonwealth v. Allen, 377 Mass. 674, 387 N.E.2d 553 (1979);
State v. McDavitt, 62 N.J. 36, 297 A.2d 849 (1972); State v. Milano, 297 N.C. 485, 256 S.E.2d 154, 162
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from proving his innocence. Such rules and requirements may very well deny
the defendant his constitutional right to compulsory process.,
II. EXPERT TESTIMONY
The rule regarding expert testimony which had existed prior to Frye v.
United States' was that "the opinions of experts or skilled witnesses are
admissible in evidence in those cases in which the matter of inquiry is such
that inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct
judgment upon it . . ... " Frye changed this rule.
Stripped to its core, Frye's two page opinion states:
[W]hile courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduc-
ed from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained
such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and
psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert
testimony deduced from the discovery, development and experiments thus
far made.8
Through the years the Frye test has been implicitly modified. "Current
case law establishes that only the opinions of polygraphers and those studying
polygraphs (rather than psychologists and physiologists as suggested by Frye)
should be considered in determining the general acceptance of polygraph
evidence." 9 As directed in People v. Williams,' a court is to look to the pro-
cedure upon which the expert opinion is based and determine if "[iut has
generally been accepted by those who would be expected to be familiar with
its use. In this age of specialization more should not be required.""II
(1979); State v. Souel, 53 Ohio St.2d 123, 372 N.E.2d 1318 (1978); State v. Ross, 7 Wash. App. 62, 497
P.2d 1343 (1972); Cullin v. State, 565 P.2d 445, 453-459 (Wyo. 1977). State v. Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228,
264 n.17, 307 N.W.2d 628, 646 n.17 (1981).
"'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor .... " U.S. Const. amend. VI.
6293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
'Id. at 1014.
lid.
'Tarlow, Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in 1975: An Aid in Determining Credibility In a Perjury-
Plagued System, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 917, 942 (1975). Even if such modification would not be allowed, "in
excess of 70% of physiologists and psychologists generally... [accept] the proposition that [polygraph]
recordings can be accurately interpreted." Id. at 943 n. 129 citing People v. Adams, No. M69424 (Alhambra
Mun. Ct. Los Angeles County, Cal., May 14, 1974).
'164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 331 P.2d 251 (1958).
"Id. at 862, P. 2d at 154.
[Vol. 16:4
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III. GENERAL ACCEPTANCE
The "general acceptance" test discovered in Frye has become the major
stumbling block to the polygraph's admission into evidence today. 2 The Frye
decision has locked within it the "magic incantation" which judges recite only
after first preparing their chambers with the burning of incense. How unfor-
tunate this case has been for those innocent defendants whose only hope for
corroboration rests upon a polygraph examination.1 3
A. Differing Standards of Trustworthiness
1. The Judge's Standard
McCormick points out that: " 'General scientific acceptance' is a proper
condition for taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for
the admissibility of scientific evidence. Any relevant conclusions which are sup-
ported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless there are other
reasons for exclusion."'
Those judges who agree with McCormick's first statement - "general
scientific acceptance" is proper for judicial notice - would, by acceptance
of the Frye standard, require them to judicially notice the polygraph's reliability
before it would be admissible as evidence. Yet, no one has claimed that the
polygraph is perfect, only that it possesses a high degree of accuracy. "[E]ven
the most ardent detractors from the validity of polygraph evidence concede
a degree of reliability of 70% or higher for properly administered
examination." I Furthermore, "the overwhelming majority believe its accuracy
is in excess of 85076 with most of those estimating over 90°0%.' '1
2. The Jury's Standard
Though it appears that trial judges may require perfection to judicially
notice the polygraph's reliability, the opportunity to require perfection or to
instead accept imperfection is generally denied the jury. In fact, "[t]he leading
authority goes so far as to state that the courts have 'very properly' declined
to lay down any more than generalized rules of competence, and suggests leaving
""It is interesting to note that although the defendant was convicted in the Frye case and sentenced to
life imprisonment, the excluded blood pressure deception results indicating his innocence were subsequently
corroborated when a third person confessed he was the real murderer. If the deception test results had
not been excluded in the Frye case, it is probable that an innocent man would not have been convicted
of murder." Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test in the Law of Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REV. 711, 715
(1953).
'"O'Conner, "That's the Man": A Sobering Study of Eye-Witness Identification and the Polygraph, 49
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1974).
"MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 491 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK].
"McMorris v. Isreal, 643 F.2d 458, 461-62 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1479 (1982).
"Tarlow, supra note 9, at 960 n.212.
Spring, 19831 COMMENTS
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the standard to the unreviewable discretion of the trial court."I
Yet this authority has been implicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in
Cool v. United States.'I In Cool, the Supreme Court held that whenever the
judge delegates the competence decision of defense testimony to the jury and
the rule of competence given to them creates an "artificial barrier" within their
minds, then the defendant's right of compulsory process has been denied.
Therefore, it only stands to reason that whenever the judge creates an actual
barrier (judicial notice) to the minds of the jury, then the defendant's rights
of compulsory process has been denied as well.
In Cool the defendant's only witness, an alleged accomplice, testified that
the defendant was not involved with the crime. The trial court instructed the
jury to disregard the accomplice testimony unless it found his testimony true
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court reversed the defendant's con-
viction. The Court, citing Washington v. Texas'9 noted that:
[A] criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to the jury excul-
patory testimony of an accomplice. The instruction given below imper-
missibly obstructs the exercise of that right by totally excluding relevant
evidence unless the jury makes a preliminary determination that it is ex-
tremely reliable.
By creating an artificial barrier to the consideration of relevant defense
testimony putatively credible by a preponderance of the evidence, the trial
judge reduced the level of proof necessary for the Government to carry
its burden. Indeed, where, as here, the defendant's case rests almost en-
tirely on accomplice testimony, the effect of judge's instructions is to re-
quire the defendant to establish his innocence beyond a reasonable doubt."
Significantly, in Cool the Supreme Court recognizes that to burden the
defendant with proving the reliability of the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt,
in essence, reverses the burden of proof in the criminal case when the defen-
dant's case rests almost entirely on such evidence.
'
7Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 135 (1974) citing 2 J. WIGMORE EVIDENCE
§ 496 at 488 (3d ed. 1940).
"Such a conclusion, however, ignores the clear implication of Washington [Washington v. Texas
388 U.S. 14 (1967)]. If disqualification of whole groups of defense witnesses by means of arbitrary
categories is unconstitutional, then disqualification of individual witnesses by means of arbitrary
standards is equally impermissible. It would be unconstitutional, for example, to disqualify a child
from testifying for the defendant on the ground that he lacked a perfect memory, or that he lacked
the ability to express himself as well as an English professor .... It prevents the jury from hearing
a material witness for the defense whose testimony may well be reliable. The present task, therefore,
is to define a standard of competence for individual witnesses that is consistent with the purpose
of the compulsory process clause." Western, supra note 17, at 135.
"408 U.S. 100 (1972).
19388 U.S. 14 (1967).
20409 U.S. at 104.
[Vol. 16:4AKRON LAW REVIEW
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B. Irregular Applications of the Rule
The Frye case is often cited by courts dealing with scientific evidence
and usually followed when admissibility of lie detector evidence is in issue.
In other areas, it has had remarkably little influence for a case that has
received so much attention ... It rears its head at irregular intervals and
in some very important cases . . .(I)t is often the precedent that is used
by courts that want to reject expert evidence but have difficulty in writing
an opinion in relevance language.2
Because the influence of the Frye decision varies depending on the type
of expert testimony used, the inference of a discriminatory standard arises -
the standard being more rigorously applied toward the polygraph than toward
other forms of expert testimony.
1. Jury Distrust Controls
[T]he courts, when undertaking to pass on the question whether the
evidence has sufficient probative value to assist the jury, mix that ques-
tion with the one of effect on the jury and seemingly require that the pro-
bative value be as great as the courts decide the jury will think it to be.
In the case of ... [the] "lie-detector", . . . the courts seem to conclude
that the jury will consider the test infallible, and so require that they be
shown to be infallible before they are admitted .... Once a requirement
of infallibility of the total test has been set up, there is scarcely any need
to refer the matter to the scientific community to find out whether a test
administered by humans is generally accepted by scientists as infallible.22
The courts, by deciding that the jury will give the polygraph too much
weight, have in effect kept evidence from the jury for the same reason co-
conspirator testimony had been before Washington23 - the evidence might
be believed. This underlying motivation for evidence exclusion exposes a
manifest distrust of a constitutionally guaranteed institution and does little to
fortify our American form of justice. Instead, justice is undermined.
2. Modified Frye Discriminates
A number of courts have had a great deal of difficulty in applying Frye.4
This difficulty "has lead a number of courts to its implicit modification. 21 5
Yet, the modified Frye rule - general acceptance within an appropriate scien-
tific community26 - has been arbitrarily applied. One example of this arbitrary
11R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG. A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 934 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE].
"McCormick, supra note 14, at 490 n.32.
"See supra note 19.
"See Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L. F. 1,16; Boyce,
Judicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, 8 UTAH L. REV. 313, 314 (1963-64).
"United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d cir. 1978).
"See supra text accompanying notes 9-11.
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application is Coppolino v. State"7 in which a test for the detection of succinic
acid in the body was specifically developed for use in this case and admitted
into evidence by the state. The State of Florida had in a prior case excluded
the polygraph from the courtroom using Frye as authority, yet in this case,
a different rule was applied. The rule being "were the scientific test . . . so
unreliable and scientifically unacceptable that their admission into evidence was
error."
28
Another example of discriminatory application is exemplified in
Washington v. United States9 where the court stated in its "Instruction to Expert
Witness in Cases Involving the 'Insanity Defense' "30 that:
We recognize that an opinion may be merely a balance of probabilities
and that we cannot demand absolute certainty. Thus you may testify to
opinions that are within the zone of reasonable medical certainty. The
crucial point is that the jury should know how your opinion may be
affected by limitations of time or facilities in the examination of this defen-
dant or by limitations in present psychiatric knowledge. The underlying
facts you have obtained may be so scanty or the state of professional
knowledge so unsure that you cannot fairly venture any opinion. If so,
you should not hesitate to say so. And, again, if you do give an opinion,
you should explain . . . the underlying facts, what these facts are, how
they led to the opinion, and what, if any, are the uncertainties in the
opinion. I
Psychiatric judgments and evaluations are commonly accepted into our
courts of law. It is interesting to note, however, that Bruce J. Ennis, a lawyer,
and Thomas R. Litwack, a lawyer and psychologist, have written an article,3 2
in which they cite studies indicating that psychiatrists are less accurate at predict-
ing dangerousness than is the flip of a coin.33 If the reliability of commonly
accepted psychiatric testimony is permitted to be less than fifty percent, there
appears to be arbitrariness in a rule which excludes evidence commonly ac-
cepted by even its opponents to be at least seventy percent reliable3 '
C. Common Arguments for Nonapplication
Opponents to the polygraph contend that analysis of the polygraph data
2223 So.2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969), appeals dismissed, 234 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 927 (1970).
"Id. at 70.
29390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
"Id. at 457.
3'Id. at 458.
"Ennis and Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom,
62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974).
"Id. at 711-16.
"4643 F.2d at 461-62.
[Vol. 16:4AKRON LAW REVIEW
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is too subjective for it to be admissible into court." But [c]learly the analysis
of polygraph charts is not 'subjective' when two competent polygraph examiners
will almost always reach the same results when interpreting the charts. 36 Cer-
tainly examiner competence is a proper subject for concern, but "[e]xpert
testimony in other fields is not conditioned on the absence of quacks and
incompetents."
37
The polygraph's opponents also conjure up visions of trial by machine.38
However, proponents of the polygraph argue contra -
The argument that the jury will be displaced by a machine or by a
polygraph examiner lacks merit .... On the whole they read widely. Large-
ly because of television they know generally what is going on in the world.
Their educational background is extensive. They think. They reason. They
are really very good at sorting out good evidence from bad, of separating
the credible witness from the incredible, and of disregarding experts who
attempt to inject their opinions into areas of which they have little
knowledge. They would welcome all evidence having a bearing on the prob-
lem they are deciding and the give and take of deliberation would expose
weaknesses in any witness or evidence. A modem jury that must deliberate,
and must agree, is the ideal body to evaluate opinions of this kind. 39
Opponents of the polygraph by reason of their position apparently believe
that the polygraph is simply unnecessary for a fair trial and, therefore, should
not be used. However, at least one commentator rebuts:
[D]oesn't that assume the conclusion? No one would seriously urge that
assessing the credibility of witnesses is not very important in judging a
case. If the polygraph aids substantially in correctly assessing credibility,
is it not necessary to a fair trial? Indeed, might the court's argument be
better turned around? If the polygraph is accurate, it may be especially
necessary to help assess witnesses' credibility because human beings are
very fallible."'
IV. COMPULSORY PROCESS
The contention that compulsory process requires the admission of the
polygraph for the defendant finds its roots implanted within the words of Chief
Justice John Marshall, who, sitting as a circuit judge wrote the opinion in United
"See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 512-13 (D. Md. 1973).
"Tarlow, supra note 9, at 962. It has been noted that competent polygraph examiners will reach identical
results on the same subject "8507o to almost 99%" of the time. Id. at n.223.
"MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE, supra note 21, at 1018.
"See, e.g., United States v. Bursten, 560 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d
161 (8th Cir. 1975).
"United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 98 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
"MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE, supra note 21, at 1020.
Spring, 1983] COMMENTS
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States v. Burr. 4' This opinion deserves considerable attention "because [it] repre-
sent[s] a contemporary construction of the clause by the preeminent constitu-
tional jurist of the time. ' 4 "Marshall had better opportunities than any student
of history or law today to discover the intention of the framers of the federal
constitution." 3 Justice Frankfurter himself stated that "[a] surer estimate" 4 "
of an amendment's meaning was possible for the judges of that time in which
it was passed than for judges of a more remote time period.
A. United States v. Burr
The precipitating cause for this case was the accusation that Aron Burr,
a former Senator and Vice-President of the United States, was attempting to
start a war with Spain and create a separate government in the western states.
At trial the defense attempted to subpoena a letter within the custody of Presi-
dent Jefferson. Justice Marshall ruled that compulsory process may be limited
only if proven its use is improper, that it applies to papers as well as to persons
and that it only requires a minimal showing of materiality to be exercised.
1. Limitation of Impropriety
Chief Justice Marshall stated that our system of government is not set
up so as to allow "condemnation at all events.""5 The defendant is to have
"a fair and impartial trial" guaranteed by giving the defendant "the right of
preparing the means to secure such a trial.' '46 The Chief Justice believed com-
pulsory process "must be deemed sacred by the courts, and . . . should be
construed as something more than a dead letter."
4
Justice Marshall, when commenting on the absolute wording of the clause,"
noted that compulsory process is "a motion to the discretion of the court." 49
Marshall was quick to point out, however, that "a motion to its discretion
is a motion, not to its inclination, but to its judgment; and its judgment is
to be guided by sound legal principles." 5 Marshall further stated that:
[T]he opposite party can, regularly, take no more interest in the award-
ing a subpoena duces tecum [cumpulsory process] than in the awarding
an ordinary subpoena .... [Therefore,] [ijf no inconvenience can be sus-
tained by the opposite party, he can only oppose the motion in the character
of an amicus curaie, to prevent the court from making an improper order,
"25 Fed. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Vir. 1807) (No. 14, 692d.).
4'Westen, supra note 17, at 102.
41Id. at 102 n.129 citing C. BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 113 (1912).
"Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 64 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"25 Fed. Cas. at 33.
"Id.
,"Id.
"4Id.
"Id. at 35.
5d.
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or from burthening some officer by compelling an unnecessary
attendance. 5' (emphasis added).
2. Application to Papers
The Chief Justice continued by ruling that it "is too much attenuated to
be countenanced in the tribunals of a just and humane nation" and that there
be a distinction between compelling the production of witnesses and papers
when either may be material to the defense.5"
3. Requirement of Materiality: Minimal
Chief Justice Marshall believed that the limited restrictions placed upon
the "sacred" right of compulsory process must be carefully examined so as
not to become broadened, denying the defendant his right.
[I]t would seem to reduce his means of defense within narrower limits
than is designed by the fundamental law of our country, if an overstrain-
ed rigor should ... apply for papers deemed by himself to be material
... [H]is judgment ought to be controlled only so far as it is apparent
that he means to exercise his privileges not really in his own defense, but
for purposes which the court ought to discountenance. The court would
not lend its aid to motions obviously designed to manifest disrespect to
the government; but the Court has no right to refuse its aid to motions
for papers to which the accused may be entitled, and which may be material
in his defense ... [I]f they may be important in the defense, if they may
be safely read at the trial, would it not be a blot in the page which records
the judicial proceedings of this country, if... the accused should be denied
the use of them?53 (emphasis added).
Chief Justice Marshall foreshadowed the existence of what we call today
''compelling state interest" and "strict scrutiny" when he states:
That there may be matter, the production of which the court would not
require, is certain; but, in a capital case, that the accused ought, in some
form, to have the benefit of it, if it were really essential to his defense,
is a position which the court would very reluctantly deny. It ought not
to be believed that the department which superintends prosecutions in
criminal cases, would be inclined to withhold it.54
One's thoughts tend to turn to the innocent defendant in the Frye decision
as we read John Marshall stating:
Should it [the prosecution] terminate ... on the part of the United States,
all those who are concerned in it should certainly regret that a paper which
'ld.
52Id
"ld.
"Id. at 37.
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the accused believed essential to his defense ... had been withheld from
him. I will not say, that his circumstance would, in any degree, tarnish
the reputation of the government; but I will say, that it would justly tar-
nish the reputation of the court which had given its sanction to its being
withheld. Might I be permitted to utter one sentiment, with respect to
myself, it would be to deplore, most earnestly, the occasion which should
compel me to look back on any part of my official conduct with so much
self-reproach as I should feel, could I declare, on the information now
possessed, that the accused is not entitled to the letter in question, if it
should be really important to him."
Concluding his opinion, the Chief Justice declared "that such a subpoena,
as is asked, ought to issue, if there exist any reason for supposing that the
testimony may be material . 56 (emphasis added).
B. Washington v. Texas
In Burr Chief Justice John Marshall read the compulsory process clause
as establishing the standards to be used when dealing with the applicability
of the clause to papers as opposed to witnesses (i.e., identical), with the materi-
ality of the desired evidence (i.e., minimal), and with the limitation upon the
compulsory process right (i.e., impropriety). In Washington v. Texas57 Chief
Justice Warren read the clause to be more than a right of the defendant to
compel a witness' appearance. He reacf it to be a tool by which the defendant
could put his witness on the stand; however, "[t]he opinion is important, beyond
its immediate holding, for its use of history, its standard of analysis, and its
reliance on the specific words of the sixth amendment instead of the 'funda-
mental fairness' requirement of due process." 5
In Washington the defendant had been convicted of murder in a trial during
which he desired to offer supporting testimony for his denial of guilt. He testified
a man named Fuller took the gun from him before the shooting. He further
testified that he tried in vain to convince Fuller to leave peacefully, and then
ran from the scene before the shooting started. Fuller, already convicted of
the murder, was ready to testify to the truth of Washington's testimony and
that he acted on his own during this killing, yet he was disqualified from testi-
fying under a Texas accomplice statute. Texas contended that it was justified
in disqualifying the witness because most certainly some "accomplices" were
unreliable. Because it could not in advance determine the unrealiable from the
reliable it had the right to disqualify all "accomplices". The defendant argued
that categorical exclusion was unnecessary because the court could let the
evidence go to the jury with instructions concerning weight and credibility. 9
5d.
"Id. at 38.
"388 U.S. 14 (1967).
"Westen, supra note 17, at 111.
"Westen, Compulsory Process II, 74 MicH. L. REV. 191, 202 (1975).
[Vol. 16:4AKRON LAW REVIEW
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Spring, 1983]
1. History of Compulsory Process
The Chief Justice began his analysis by referring to In re Oliver ° and stating
that "compulsory process ... stands on no lesser footing than the other Sixth
Amendment rights that we have previously held applicable to the States."'
The Chief Justice continued, holding: "The right to offer the testimony of
witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the
right to present a defense . . . .This right is a fundamental element of due
process of law. ' 62
Being a fundamental element of due process, it is applicable to state
proceedings.63
Chief Justice Warren utilizes history to point out the reactionary purpose
which exists behind the compulsory process clause.
[T]he right to compulsory process was included in the Bill of Rights in
reaction to the notorious common-law rule that in cases of treason or felony
the accused was not allowed to introduce witnesses in his defense at all
... .[T]he framers of the Constitution felt it necessary specifically to
provide that defendants in criminal cases should be provided the means
of obtaining witnesses so that their own evidence, as well as the prosecu-
tion's, might be evaluated by the jury.64
The Chief Justice points out that even though the compulsory process clause
existed and was recognized as a reaction to the abuses of the past, the Supreme
Court in United States v. Reid5 held the rules of evidence in the federal courts
to be those which existed within the states at the passage of the Judiciary Act
of 1789.6 The states in 1789 had various rules which disqualified defense
witnesses on the ground of interest. These rules, through this holding, became
the rules of the various federal courts The unspoken rationale for such dis-
qualification rules was the "the right to present witnesses was subordinate to
the court's interest in preventing perjury, and that erroneous decisions were
best avoided by preventing the jury from hearing any testimony that might
be perjured, even if it were the only testimony available on a crucial issue."61 7
In essence, "[t]he courts were afraid to trust the intelligence of jurors. 68
60333 U.S. 257 (1948).
"1388 U.S. at 18.
"Id. at 19.
63/d.
"Id. at 19-20.
"53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1852).
"1388 U.S. at 21.
67Id.
"Id. at 21 n.18 quoting Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 336 (1892).
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The Supreme Court, however, in time saw the error of its way and reversed
itself though on non-constitutional grounds, in Rosen v. United States.69 Chief
Justice Warren gave the reasoning of Rosen its constitutional character by declar-
ing that its language was required by the sixth amendment. Hence, the sixth
amendment requires the recognition of
"the conviction of our time that the truth is more likely to be arriv-
ed at by hearing the testimony of all persons of competent understanding
who may seem to have knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leaving
the credit and weight of such testimony to be determined by the jury or
by the court." 70 (emphasis added).
By constitutionalizing these words Warren broke compulsory process free
from the "dead hand of the common law rule of 1789' and totally reversed
the premise to be considered when contemplating the exclusion of defense
evidence. The right to present defense witnesses would no longer be subordinate
to the court's interest in preventing perjury.
2. Standard of Analysis: Arbitrariness
Having rejected the "dead hand" of the past the Chief Justice considered
whether the rule was "arbitrary" by present constitutional standards. The
Warren Court decided the disqualification was arbitrary because it placed
witnesses into categories which presumed them to be untrustworthy without
any showing that everyone within the category was necessarily so.
In light of the ... [fact] that the Sixth Amendment was designed in part
to make the testimony of a defendant's witnesses admissible on his behalf
in court, it could hardly be argued that a State would not violate the clause
if it made all defense testimony inadmissible as a matter of procedural
law. It is difficult to see how the Constitution is any less violated by
arbitrary rules that prevent whole categories of defense witnesses from
testifying on the basis of a priori categories that presume them unworthy
of belief. 2
Chief Justice Warren points out that his disqualification rule cannot even
pass the lowest level of judicial scrutiny - rationality - because of the excep-
tions made to it.
The rule disqualifying an alleged accomplice from testifying on behalf
of the defendant cannot even be defended on the ground that it ration-
ally sets apart a group of persons who are particularly likely to commit
perjury. The absurdity of the rule is amply demonstrated by the excep-
tions that have been made to it."3
"1245 U.S. 467 (1918).
1*388 U.S. at 22. citing Rosen, 245 U.S. at 471.
WId.
72Id.
73Id.
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In concluding his opinion Chief Justice Warren relies on the specific words
of the compulsory process clause - instead of the general standard of due
process - stating:
We hold that the petitioner in this case was denied his right to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor because the State
arbitrarily denied him the right to put on the stand a witness who was
physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had per-
sonally observed, and whose testimony would be relevant and material
to the defense."
As if to emphasize the courts rejection of any literal construction of the
compulsory process clause - that the clause only compels appearance, not
testimony - in favor of a historical construction - that the clause compels
testimony - Warren punctuates the court's holding with the words: "The
Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the futile act of giving
to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony
he had no right to use.75 The Warren Court could not believe that the Framers'
ancestors had struggled so long for something that could be so easily
circumvented.
V. DUE PROCESS: Chambers v. Mississippi
The two compulsory process cases just discussed - Burr and Washington
- have gone a long way in giving shape and definition to the clause. Burr
applied the clause to papers and to evidence having only slight materiality while
allowing the prosecution to challenge its utilization only in the event that its
exercise would be improper. Washington made the clause a tool to be used
by the defendant to put his evidence on the stand. It did so by stating that
the credit and weight of defense testimony is exclusively the province of the
jury and that a priori categories for exclusion of defense testimony are generally
invalid. Washington also held that compulsory process ia a fundamental right
of due process.
Eventually, a compulsory process case was taken to the United States
Supreme Court under the auspices of the due process clause in Chambers v.
Mississippi.76 The Court in Chambers disavowed the fact that it was making
"Id. at 23.
7SId.
"410 U.S. 284 (1973). The reasons why Chambers is a due process instead of a compulsory process case
may lie in the facts that:
(1) It's author, "Powell, opposes incorporating the specifics of the Bill of Rights into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment."
(2) Chambers "had not mentioned the compulsory process clause as the basis of his rights" in the
lower courts.
(3) The Court "was invalidating the application of a well-established state rules of evidence." The
Court invalidated them because it felt the facts made the decision appropriate in that Chambers
was likely to be innocent; therefore, a due process analysis was utilized because it "allows the
Court to tailor its decision rather strictly to the facts presented."
MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE, supra note 21, at 599.
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any new constitutional principles.77 Perhaps this is so because this case fell well
within the reasoning already set forth in Burr and Washington.
The facts of Chambers are relatively simple. The defendant was arrested
for murder. Subsequently, another person, McDonald, gave a written confes-
sion, which was later repudiated. McDonald also admitted to a different friend
on three separate occasions - three friends in all - that he, himself, was the
actual killer. Chambers called McDonald as a witness in his defense, but was
prevented from cross-examining him because of Mississippi's common law
voucher rule. Chambers was also prevented from calling those to whom
McDonald had confessed, because of the state's hearsay rule. In effect,
Chambers claimed that the state's use of these rules, thwarting his defense,
had violated his right to due process.
The errors were essentially the converse of each other. The voucher rule
prevented Chambers from confronting the witness against him and the hear-
say rule prevented him from presenting witnesses in his favor. The Court held
that in combination the two errors unconstitutionally deprived the defendant
of due process.78
A. The Voucher Rule
As if to say the exclusionary voucher rule was based upon an a priori
category that presumes trustworthiness, the Court points out that "[tihe rule
rests upon the presumption - without regard to the circumstances of the par-
ticular case - that a party who calls a witness 'vouches for his credibility ' ' 79
The Court realistically determined that "defendants are rarely able to select
their witnesses: they must take them where they find them." 8" Furthermore,
the Court acknowledged that Chambers was "precluded from cross-
examining"'" the witness as well as "restricted in the scope of his direct exami-
nation .... "82 Therefore, "[t]he 'voucher' rule, as applied in this case, plain-
ly interfered with Chambers' right to defend against the State's charges." 83
B. The Hearsay Rule
Perhaps the Court took note of the fact that Washington v. Texas no longer
would allow the right to present defense witnesses to be subordinated to the
court's interest in preventing perjury when it pointed out: "The hearsay rule
...is based on experience and grounded in the notion that untrustworthy
"See 410 U.S. at 302.
1'd.
"Id. at 295.
"Id. at 296.
'Id.
12Id. at 296-97.
"Id. at 298.
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evidence should not be presented to the triers of fact.""4 "Exclusion . . . is
usually premised on the view that admission would lead to the frequent presen-
tation of perjured testimony to the jury." 8 5
The Court realized that categorical exclusion of evidence which may only
be frequently perjurious was not sufficient to pass constitutional muster; for
if such evidence is not necessarily perjurious, the classification to which it belongs
is an a priori category that presumes the evidence unworthy of belief. The
Court's knowledge of this fact may be implied through its discussion on the
reliability of this "declaration against interest". This type of hearsay is not
necessarily perjurious, because it is "made under circumstances that tend to
assure reliability and thereby compensate for the absence of oath and oppor-
tunity for cross-examination." 86 One is "unlikely to fabricate a statement against
his own interest at the time it is made".8 7
Applying its analysis to the facts in question, the Court held that:
The testimony rejected by the trial court here bore persuasive assurances
of trustworthiness and thus was well within the basic rationale of the excep-
tion for declarations against interest. That testimony also was critical to
Chambers' defense. In these circumstances, where constitutional rights
directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay
rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice. 8
It was unnecessary for the Chambers Court to lay down the broad outlines
of its analysis. Those outlines had been sufficiently presented in Burr and
Washington. The Chambers Court followed these decisions and ruled: because
the testimony "bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness", the trial court
could not "presume them unworthy of belief" (Washington); because the
"testimony also was critical to Chambers' defense", the trial court must have
recognized that the testimony at a very minimum "may be material in his
defense" (Burr); and because the rules - even though they may have a logical
persuasiveness - were "applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice",
the trial court improperly made its decision "on the basis of a priori categories"
(Washington).
There are those who herald Chambers as the dawning of a new age. 9 There
are those who decry Chambers as the wresting of authority which is rightfully
to be placed in the states.9" To answer the former: The dawn is done, they
have merely overslept. To answer the latter: A state may not utilize rules of
8-1d.
"Id. at 299.
"6Id.
87id.
"Id. at 302.
"Kaus, Proceedings of the 1973 Sentencing Institute for Superior Judges, 1973 JUD. COUNS. OF CAL. 97,
reprinted in 112 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1973).
"See 410 U.S. at 308 (Renquist, J., dissenting).
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evidence to violate a defendant's right - upon what the Constitution does not
allow, logical legal scholarship may not tread.
Many will continue to fear and fight against the continuing development
of the compulsory process clause. Yet, if individuals can so ingeniously pre-
sent persuasive arguments for ignoring the dictates of the Constitution, then
one can confidently place his faith in those same men to establish a means to
regulate the rights the Constitution was meant to preserve.
VI. POLYGRAPH EXCLUSION
The compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment is a companion
and counterpart to the confrontation clause. The confrontation clause
governs the manner by which the state presents its case against the accused,
requiring the prosecution to bring the defendant face to face with the
witness against him and make them available for cross-examination. The
compulsory process clause governs the presentation of the defendant's
case, empowering him to produce and examine witnesses in his favor.
Together they provide a constitutional basis for the law of evidence in
criminal proceedings. Together "[they] constitutionalize the right to a
defense as we know it." 9'
The right of compulsory process working in tandem with the right of con-
frontation creates a balance which favors the defendant" because of the poten-
tially oppressive resources which may be wielded by the government while in
the hands of the prosecutor. 93 The Framers were well aware of the existence
and use of such resources. They were determined to disallow the inquisitional
method by promoting the adversarial process.9"
By doing so, they gave the defendant "the right to discover the existence
of witnesses in his favor, to produce them in court, to introduce their statements
into evidence, and, if necessary, to compel them to testify over claims of
priviledge." 9 There is a "constitutional judgment embodied in the compulsory
process clause that the government must not convict any person who can prove
that he is innocent." 96
A. Unreliability: Reasonable Minds Do Not Differ
In general, "the defendant has a constitutional right to produce any witness
whose ability to give reliable evidence is something about which reasonable
people can differ."97 The polygraph's reliability has been a matter of great
"Westen, supra note 17, at 1982 citing California v. Green, 339 U.S. 149, 176 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
"See Westen, supra note 17, at 156.
"See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 111-12 (1970).
"See Westen, supra note 17, at 78.
"Id. at 184.
16Id. at 177.
"Westen, supra note 59, at 203.
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debate"8 ; therefore, obviously reasonable minds do differ.
B. Compelling State Interest: Less Drastic Means Unavailable
When the state limits a fundamental right the Court will review it using
"strict scrutiny". 99 "Under the strict scrutiny standard the Court requires that
the law be necessary to promote a compelling or overriding interest of govern-
ment if it is to limit the fundamental rights of individual citizens." 10 0 In other
words, there must be no less drastic alternatives available to accomplish the
state's objective.
The less drastic alternative need not be equally efficient, so long as it is
adequate. Washington did not suggest that a jury determination of the
accomplice's credibility was as efficient in avoiding perjury as disqualify-
ing the witness; the state would obviously prefer disqualification because
it is fool-proof. By requiring the accomplice to be heard, however, the
Court implicitly held that screening by the jury was an adequate alter-
native, and that added effectiveness, if any, of disqualification did not
justify the additional burden it imposes on the defendant.'0 ' (emphasis
in original).
A rule excluding the polygraph is not founded upon any compelling state
interest. The rule is in fact "arbitrary."
[B]y use of the term "arbitrary" the [Washington] Court was referring
to the fact that the Texas rule imposed an unnecessary burden on the defen-
dant's right to present witnesses because the rule wholly excluded evidence
that might have been reliable instead of permitting it to be heard, weighed,
and judged by the fact-finder. 0 2 (emphasis in original).
Washington implies that by allowing the witness to testify under oath sub-
ject to cross-examination, by giving cautionary instructions, and by allowing
the prosecutor to comment, leaving the weight and credibility of his testimony
to the jury, the state can adequately satisfy its interests by a less drastic means. 3
It is improper for a state to create an unqualified assumption that the only
way to avoid misleading the jury is to exclude all polygraph evidence. Undoubt-
ably, there may be polygraphers so unprofessional, techniques so invalid and
machines so unreliable that a state's interest may become compelling, but the
state shall not assume such to be the case generally.
9"See, e.g., Lhost v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 620, 271 N.W. 2d 121 (1978); State v. Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228, 307
N.W.2d 628 (1981).
91J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA AND J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 383 (1978).
-'Id.
*-'westen, supra note 17, at 137.
'02Westen, supra note 59, at 200.
"'See Westen, supra note 17, at 136.
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It shall be remembered, of course, that non-arbitrary disqualification of
evidence is valid. This is so "not simply because the trial court individualizes
its determination, but because, in doing so, it presumably applies the strict stan-
dard of disqualifying only those witnesses whose competence is not reasonably
disputable." 0 4 Also, where the evidence is so inherently unreliable that it can-
not rationally be evaluated the jury shall not be allowed to consider the defen-
dant's evidence. In such a case the jury is left with nothing except mere con-
jecture or speculation. Exclusion would be based on the "notion that a criminal
trial - indeed, any trial - ceases to be a judicial proceeding when the out-
come rests in evidence that cannot be rationally considered." 105
C. Burden of Proof. Prosecutors Bear
It is incumbent upon the state to prove its compelling interest. The defen-
dant has no constitutional obligation to prove the admissibility of his evidence. ,06
Therefore, neither may the state require such an obligation. Should the
prosecutor object to its admission, it is the prosecutor's burden to prove the
state's compelling interest in its exclusion.'0 '
The converse is not true should the prosecution attempt to admit polygraph
evidence against the defendant. To allow the prosecution to admit polygraph
evidence in the same manner as the defendant would ignore basic differences
which exist between them. These differences were recognized in Washington
by the Court's rejection of Harlan's narrow ground of reversal - the rule
discriminated against the accused.' 0
The Court, while agreeing with Harlan that the rule was discriminatory,
refused to rest on that narrow ground. It distinguished between the
discriminatory effect of the rule and its "arbitrary" effect. Even if the
rule disqualified accomplices from testifying for both parties in the case,
it was nonetheless "arbitrary" because it imposed an unnecessary burden
on the defendant's right to present a defense.' 9
A key difference between the prosecution and the defense lies in the fact
that the duty of the prosecuting attorney is to do justice,"0 while such is not
the case for the defense attorney. Also, and perhaps most importantly, the con-
frontation doctrine is guaranteed only to the defendant. These differences require
the prosecution to convict an accused using only reliable evidence; therefore,
the burden of proof is upon the prosecution to prove that its polygraph evidence
is reliable - no such burden is required of the defendant. To assure the reliability
''Westen, supra note 59, at 203.
1"Westen, supra note 17, at 157.
'6See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
"°'See supra text accompanying notes 45-51. See also Westen, supra note 17, at 156.
"'See 388 U.S. at 24 (Harlan, J., concurring).
"'MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE, supra note 21 at 589.
"'Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
[Vol. 16:4AKRON LAW REVIEW
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 16 [1983], Iss. 4, Art. 8
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol16/iss4/8
of the prosecution's evidence, the defendant was given the right of confronta-
tion - no such right is guaranteed the prosecution. Accordingly, when the
state offers incriminating evidence against the accused that cannot be cross-
examined, "it must demonstrate that the evidence has such independent indicia
of reliability that cross-examination would serve no real purpose. ' ' I
An argument having much support today is that our juries are too ignorant
to realize that a polygraph examination is not infallible.' 2 If this argument
is as sound as its proponents contend, then the confrontation clause would
in fact prevent the prosecution's use of polygraph evidence entirely. The defen-
dant cannot confront this pre-conceived notion which would undoubtedly deter-
mine his fate. However, if juries are as enlightened as some commentators
contend," 3 this problem of prejudice could be resolved in voir dire.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Burr and Washington cases establish and Chambers affirms that at
a minimum compulsory process encompasses the right of the defendant to put
on the stand favorable evidence. Evidence includes both papers and witnesses.
The witnesses must be of competent understanding. It also requires evidence
to be relevant to the case and potentially material to the verdict.
Implicitly, compulsory process is limited by a compelling state interest,
but this is to be found only where less drastic means are not available.
Washington assumes by implication that perjury penalties, vigorous cross-
examination, and cautionary instructions are adequate by constitutional stan-
dards to safeguard the state's interests.
To place a higher burden upon the defendant than that which is allowed
by the Constitution - especially a burden as heavy as judicial notice - is a
clear violation of the defendant's rights. Washington v. Texas reversed the
premise for judicial exclusionary determinations concerning defense evidence
- the jury is to be trusted even if the threat of unreliability is great. Certainly,
the defendant's use of polygraph evidence should be allowed when psychiatric
judgements and evaluations, some of which are less than fifty percent accurate,
are readily admitted.
Generally, exculpatory polygraph evidence which is to be used by the
defense satisfies the admissibility requirements and exists beyond the reach of
any compelling state interest. Some courts and judges are beginning to recognize
the validity of this argument. State v. Sims' held compulsory process was
'"Westen, supra note 17, at 156.
"'See supra text accompanying note 38.
"'See supra text accompanying note 39.
"52 Ohio Misc.31, 369 N.E.2d 24 (1977).
Spring, 1983] COMMENTS
19
Walsh: Polygraph Admission
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1983
denied the defendant when his pretrial and trial requests for a polygraph
examination were not granted.1"' State v. Dorsey"' held the requirements of
a stipulation by the parties to a polygraph examination and the absence of an
objection at trial were both "mechanistic in nature" and "inconsistent with
the concept of due process". 117 Justice Dore, dissenting in State v. Renfro,1I 8
states that "[a]llowing the defendant to introduce polygraph evidence under
these circumstances while denying the opportunity to the prosecution is con-
sistent with our criminal justice system's presumption of the accused's
innocence." 1'9 Most recently, McMorris v. Israel, 120 held that a prosecutor's
discretion to withhold his consent to the defendant's introduction of exculpatory
polygraphy evidence must be based on the unreliability of the defendant's pro-
posed polygraph test, not on tactical considerations.
The sooner the courts recognize the compulsory process clause's appli-
cability to the defendant's exculpatory polygraph evidence, the sooner the Con-
stitution will no longer be honored more in its breach than in its observance.
TIMOTHY J. WALSH
"'State v. Levert, 58 O.St.2d 213, 389 N.E.2d 848 (1979) has held directly to the contrary. However,
the compulsory process analysis was not made. Instead, it was argued the polygraph had "come of age"
(Brief of Defendant-Appellant p. 12).
"88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975).
"'Id. at 185, 539 P.2d at 205.
"'96 Wash.2d 902, 639 P.2d 737 (1982).
"'Id. at 913, 639 P.2d at 742-43 n.1. (Dore, J., dissenting).
"'0643 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1479 (1982).
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